One of the most robust empirical regularities in bargaining is the phenomenon called the deadline e¤ ect: the agreement is delayed until the very last minute before the deadline. In this paper we show that optimism about future bargaining power naturally generates a deadline e¤ect. Optimism before elections generates a similar delay, which we refer to as the election e¤ ect. We further show that deadline and election e¤ects are special cases of a more general phenomenon, the durability e¤ ect, which applies when the discipline on players'beliefs about bargaining prospects dramatically increases over a short period of time.
e.g., Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker, 1988) ). The labor negotiations are settled only at the "eleventh hour" before a strike starts and the litigants pursue costly negotiations only to reach an "agreement on the steps of the courthouse." These are all well-known by the practitioners of negotiation. Recently, general public also witnessed dramatic examples of deadline e¤ect in the political arena. The Democratic and Republican leaders reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling on July 31 2011 and passed a law only on August 2, 2011, under the threat of a US Treasury default on August 3, 2011. In "…scal cli¤" negotiations of late 2012, they reached an agreement on a new tax law late on the new year eve, in order to avert an across-the-board tax increase starting in the new year (the president signed the bill on January 2, 2013).
Deadlines are not the only sources of political gridlock: Elections appear to be another factor. Mayhew (1991) shows that the US Congresses between 1947-1990 enacted 25% fewer important laws on average when they convened in the two years before a presidential election compared to the two years after (see Section 4.4 for details). Binder (2000) notes as an example that House Republicans were reluctant to negotiate over tax cuts in late 1999, after President Bill Clinton vetoed their initial proposal, in the hopes of regaining the presidency. Their beliefs were in fact vindicated, and under the presidency of George W.
Bush, Republicans managed to pass a sweeping tax cut legislation in 2001 shortly after the election.
One rationale for gridlock, proposed by many authors, 1 is optimism: players might be holding out since they both perceive there will be a better opportunity to strike deal. A major challenge for this rationale is to explain why optimism leads to gridlock at certain times, such as before deadlines or elections, but not at other times, such as shortly before deadlines or after elections. In this paper, we address this challenge by modeling explicitly players' beliefs about their bargaining prospects. We show that optimism about future bargaining power naturally generates a deadline e¤ect. Optimism before elections generates a similar delay, which we refer to as the election e¤ect. We also establish that deadline and election e¤ects are special cases of a more general phenomenon, the durability e¤ect, which applies when the discipline on players'beliefs dramatically increases over time.
Our model features two risk-neutral players, say Ann and Bob, who are negotiating in order to divide a dollar. Ann's bargaining power at time t, . In sequential bargaining, the bargaining power corresponds to the probability of the player making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er at time t. In the context of a congressional negotiation, in which players correspond to parties, a party's bargaining power can be thought of as capturing political factors such as the fraction of House and Senate members that support the party on the negotiated issue.
We take the bargaining power as an exogenous stochastic process, and characterize how it translates into endogenous bargaining outcomes. Our key ingredient is optimism about the evolution of the bargaining power. We assume that t. This enables us to put a modicum of discipline on players' beliefs. However, we allow
Ann and Bob to have optimistic beliefs about their own bargaining powers at a future time t > t. To …x ideas, suppose at time t Ann expects her bargaining power at time t to be 3=4 on average. This implies Ann expects Bob's bargaining power at time t to be 1=4 on average. But suppose Bob also expects his bargaining power at time t to be 3=4. Observe that Bob is optimistic about his own bargaining power relative to Ann. Symmetrically, Ann is optimistic about her own bargaining power relative to Bob. We quantify players'optimism by the extent to which the sum of their expectations of their own bargaining powers exceeds 1. In this example, Ann and Bob's optimism about time t is measured by 3=4+3=4 1 = 1=2.
Optimism about the bargaining power at the deadline leads to the deadline e¤ect. The basic rationale is rather straightforward, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 (Deadline E¤ect). Suppose that there is a …rm deadline at time t , after which the negotiations end. First suppose the negotiations reach time t . If Ann and Bob do not agree at this time, then they each receive zero. Thus, the surplus from agreement is the whole negotiated dollar. Consequently, Ann and Bob agree on dividing the dollar according to their bargaining powers, giving
Ann t
to Ann and Bob t to Bob. Next consider an earlier time t < t at which Ann and Bob have the optimistic beliefs described above. Suppose the time t value of receiving one dollar at time t is more than 2=3 dollars. Then, Ann believes she can obtain more than 2=3 3=4 = 1=2 dollars simply by waiting until time t . Similarly, Bob believes he can obtain more than 1=2 dollars by waiting until time t . Clearly, there is no division of the dollar at time t that can satisfy both players'optimistic expectations.
When such optimism is maintained at each time t < t , the outcome exhibits the deadline e¤ect: Ann and Bob wait until time t to reach an agreement.
This example provides a rationale for the deadline e¤ect, based on optimism. In the last minute, the players agree because the cost of delay is very large. Moreover, the terms of a last minute agreement are greatly a¤ected by the players'bargaining powers at that time.
Hence, any optimism about the bargaining powers in the last minute translates directly into optimism about the terms of a last minute agreement. This entices optimistic players to wait until the last minute to strike a deal. The delay may cost a half of the negotiated dollar.
Under optimism, a similar behavior emerges when the bargaining power becomes very durable at some time t . This is illustrated next.
Example 2 (Durability E¤ect). Imagine that there is no deadline but starting some time t the bargaining power becomes constant:
Ann t to Bob.
Suppose also that, the bargaining power is not constant before time t , which allows Ann and Bob to be optimistic about their bargaining powers at time t . If players'optimism at each time t < t is su¢ ciently strong, as in the previous example, then the outcome exhibits a durability e¤ect: Ann and Bob disagree before time t , and agree at time t with shares that re ‡ect their bargaining powers.
In this example, players agree at time t since the bargaining power will not change in the future, dividing the dollar according to their current bargaining powers. Consequently, any earlier optimism about the bargaining powers at time t translates directly into optimism about the terms of an agreement at time t . If the bargaining power is not constant before time t , then optimistic players are enticed to wait until time t to strike a deal.
As an application, consider wage negotiations between a union and an employer. Suppose there is a pending labor law that will be enacted at time t . The terms of the law can a¤ect the bargaining power between the union and the employer. Moreover, the bargaining power is more durable after time t -as it would take a long time to enact a new law-but less durable before time t since there could be many last minute changes in the law. If the players are optimistic that these changes will increase their own bargaining powers, then Example 2 predicts the agreement will be delayed until the law is enacted. More generally, the durability e¤ect predicts bargaining delays in the run-up to major reforms that could a¤ect (optimistic) players'bargaining powers in related individual negotiations.
A variant of this example can also explain the delays in the run-up to elections, as we illustrate next. This example provides one explanation for delays in congressional bargaining in the runup to presidential elections. In that context, bargaining power might change considerably depending on the outcome of the election. In particular, the party who wins the presidency will presumably have more bargaining power (e.g., due to the president's veto power).
Example 3 (Election E¤ect
Moreover, parties'post-election bargaining powers are unlikely to change signi…cantly for a considerable while (e.g., until the midterm election). If the parties are optimistic that their candidate will win the election, then Example 3 predicts that parties will disagree before the election, and agree after the election with terms that re ‡ect relatively more the interests of the winning party-consistent with Republicans passing a tax cut legislation in 2001.
Examples 1-3 share two common features that are crucial in generating delays. First, at time t , the players'bargaining powers translate into their agreement shares. Intuitively, either the imminent deadline or the subsequent durability provides a discipline on how optimistic Ann and Bob can be about their bargaining prospects in the future. This in turn induces them to reach agreement with shares that re ‡ect their current bargaining powers.
Second, before time t , there is no such discipline on players'beliefs. In particular, either the lack of a deadline as in Example 1, or the volatility of the environment as in Example 2, or the upcoming election as in Example 3, allow Ann and Bob to have optimistic beliefs about their bargaining prospects in the future. When optimism is su¢ ciently large, there is no division that can meet both players'in ‡ated expectations, which leads to delays.
The common principle behind delays is then a dramatic increase of discipline on players'
optimism. Examples 1-2 illustrate that deadlines and durability play similar disciplining roles. To see that this is no coincidence, imagine a stochastic deadline that arrives on a small interval (t ; t + ") with high probability p. Although the interval (t ; t + ") is very short according to the calendar, it may be an eternity from the players'point of view: the value of a dollar at time t + " is only 1 p dollars at time t . Assuming the bargaining power remains approximately constant in that short interval, the bargaining power remains nearly constant for eternity from the players' point of view. Hence, the durability and deadline e¤ects established above are the two sides of the same coin. Example 3 further illustrates that discipline on optimism at a time is determined by "the weakest link" of durability following that time. Observe that, prior to the election, Ann and Bob perceive the bargaining power in the future to be durable most of the time except for the short election period, over which it will be highly non-durable. Nonetheless, this short period of non-durability is su¢ cient to eliminate the discipline on their beliefs.
When are the e¤ects identi…ed in Examples 1-3 more powerful? To address this question,
we analyze the determinants of the length of disagreement before deadlines and elections. The severity of gridlock depends on-among other things-changes in the durability bargaining power. In particular, we obtain an additional lame duck e¤ect, by which an upcoming election generates longer delays if the incumbent politician is not eligible to be reelected. This is because an election without an incumbent constitutes a greater drop in durability compared to an election in which the incumbent candidate has a non-trivial chance of being reelected. In Section 4.4, we present preliminary evidence from the legislative politics in the US that supports our election and lame duck e¤ects. Speci…cally, we extend and con…rm Mayhew's (1991) …nding that the US Congresses that convene before presidential elections seem to enact fewer important laws. More interestingly, the evidence suggests that the election e¤ect is especially powerful if the incumbent president is approaching the end of his/her two-term limit-consistent with our lame duck e¤ect.
This paper makes two main contributions to the bargaining literature. First, we provide a model in which the bargaining power is exogenously speci…ed as a continuous-time stochastic
process. This enables us to capture durability by imposing a condition on the underlying stochastic process, and to capture optimism by allowing agents to have heterogeneous prior beliefs about the process. Second, we apply our model to establish the deadline, election, and durability e¤ects-and their relationship-thereby providing a uni…ed explanation for bargaining delays in seemingly distinct scenarios. We discuss our contribution relative to the literature in more detail in Section 6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our general bargaining model and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. This section also presents a closed form solution when players have common priors. The heart of the paper is Section 4, which introduces a tractable canonical case with optimism and presents our main result, the durability e¤ect, in this context. We then obtain the deadline and the election e¤ects as slight variants of this analysis, formalizing the conceptual relationship between the three e¤ects. We also establish comparative statics for when delays before deadlines and elections are more likely, and confront some of these results with data. Section 5 generalizes our results beyond the canonical case. As a caveat, we show that some intuitive notions of durability of bargaining power fail to provide discipline on players'beliefs. We then identify appropriate notions of durability that provide such discipline, which we use to present a generalized durability e¤ect.
General Environment and Equilibrium
Consider two risk-neutral players, i; j 2 f1; 2g, who negotiate over a continuum of times,
, in order to pick some x 2 [0; 1]. Player 1 and 2's preferences over x are respectively given by u 1 (x) = x and u 2 (x) = 1 x. The players also discount the future at the common rate r, so their payo¤s from striking a deal at time t are respectively given by e rt x and e rt (1 x). The players can strike a deal only at times on a grid T = f0; 1=n; 2=n; : : :g, where n is a large integer.
Our …rst ingredient is a deadline, which we model as a continuous random variable over
, and if players have not agreed before time t, then negotiations end at time t with each player receiving 0. Let F ( ) denote the cumulative distribution function and f ( ) denote the density function corresponding to d. We assume F (t) < 1 for each t 2 R + , so that the hazard rate,
, is well de…ned. Note that the hazard rate captures the probability that the deadline arrives at the next instant if it has not arrived by time t. We …nd it convenient to work with the e¤ective discount rate that combines time discounting with the deadline hazard rate:
We also de…ne the e¤ective discount factor between times t and s as
Note that player i's expected payo¤ at time t from reaching an agreement at time s is simply given by t;s u i (x).
Our key object is a player's bargaining power, denoted by i t . As in the standard bargaining literature, we de…ne the bargaining power as the probability that player i makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in a sequential bargaining game. As we will see, the bargaining power is also equal to the fraction of the surplus from agreement a player gets in addition to her continuation value from delay. We take the bargaining power as an exogenously given process and explore how it translates into bargaining outcomes in equilibrium. The players do know the current bargaining power but they may have subjective, possibly optimistic, beliefs about the future bargaining powers.
Formally, consider a stochastic process, ( 1 t ) t2R + , de…ned over a state space . If the state of the world is ! 2 , then the bargaining power of player 1 at time t is 1 t (!), and the bargaining power of player 2 is the residual, 2 t (!) = 1 1 t (!). We assume that 1 t (!) and 2 t (!) are publicly observable at time t. We write P i for the probability distribution over the state space that captures the belief of player i. We also write E i t for the expectation operator of player i at time t. We assume that the sample paths, t 7 ! i t (!) are piecewise continuous for almost all !. We also assume the bargaining power process is stochastically independent from the deadline d.
Traditionally, one would assume that the parties have identical beliefs, i.e.,
In this paper, we depart from the (CPA) and assume instead that parties are optimistic. Note that players agree on the current bargaining power, 1 t (which they both observe). However, they can be optimistic about the future values of the bargaining power. To facilitate the analysis, we de…ne the optimism at time t about time s t (as a function of !):
Here, y t;s is the amount by which a player over-estimates her own bargaining power with respect to the other player, i.e.
i s for i 6 = j. In general, y t;s can take any value in [ 1; 1] . The common prior assumption corresponds to the case in which y t;s = 0 for all times t and s t. Optimism at a particular time t about a future time s is captured by y t;s > 0.
Given the process ( 1 t ) t2R + , the bargaining is modeled as follows. At each time t 2 T , player i is recognized as the proposer with probability i t . The recognized player o¤ers some
. If the other player accepts the o¤er, then the game ends, picking x. Otherwise, the game continues to the next period -unless there is a deadline arrival, in which case the game ends and players receive 0. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Remark 1 (Relationship with Existing Bargaining Models). If i t is deterministic, then our game is identical to the standard random-proposer model (Binmore 1987 ; Merlo and Wilson 1995). Here we allow i t to be stochastic so that the players can have subjective uncertainty about the recognition probability at a future time and can learn about that probability as time passes. Moreover, we take the bargaining power as a function of the real time, independently of how frequently players come together to negotiate. In fact we will often focus on the solution in the continuous time limit as n ! 1. This approach is particularly useful to model the durability of the bargaining power. In contrast, the usual alternating o¤er bargaining models imply a highly non-durable bargaining power that shifts from one extreme to the other in…nitely frequently. 2 The closest work is Yildiz (2003) , who also allows the players to have subjective beliefs about the recognition. With respect to Yildiz (2003) , our main innovation is the introduction of publicly observable process Remark 2 (Uncertain and Soft Deadlines). We work with a stochastic deadline to capture the fact that bargaining deadlines in practice are often uncertain or soft. In the recent US debt ceiling negotiations, the deadline can be thought of as the time at which the Treasury will reach the statutory debt limit. In practice, this time is somewhat uncertain since Federal government expenses are not entirely predictable. Moreover, the deadline is also soft in the sense that the Treasury might use accounting maneuvers to continue making payments for a while after the statutory limit is reached. The …nal deadline at which the Treasury actually runs out of money can be quite uncertain, as captured by our formulation. For another example, consider legal negotiations, such as plea bargaining, in which the deadline can be 2 In fact, bargaining power in those models also depends on subtle details of the bargaining procedure. Consider the alternating-o¤er bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982) . If the real-time delays after the times at which party 1 makes an o¤er are K times as long as those after party 2 makes o¤ers, then party 1 gets K times as much as party 2 gets in the continuous-time limit. In contrast, the parameter, K, would not a¤ect the continuous time limit solution of our model (given our assumption that the sample paths are piecewise continuous almost surely). thought of as the time at which the court will reach a judgement. This deadline is not only highly uncertain but also soft in the sense that in some cases the judgement can be appealed.
Characterization of Equilibrium
Let V i t denote the continuation value of player i at time t (as a function of !) after 1 t is revealed but before the proposer at time t is recognized. By individual rationality, V i t is restricted to be in [0; 1]. Given a subsequent negotiation time s 2 T , we de…ne
as the sum of players' perceived payo¤s from delaying agreement (or waiting) until time s. Note that W t;t+1=n captures players' total perceived payo¤ from waiting until the next negotiation time. Hence, 1 W t;t+1=n captures players'perceived surplus from agreeing at time t.
First suppose W t;t+1=n < 1, so that the surplus at time t is positive. Then, it is easy to check that the players reach an agreement with the proposer receiving the full surplus.
Hence, player i's expected payo¤ before the proposer is recognized is given by:
In particular, players split the surplus according to their bargaining powers, i t . Next suppose the surplus is negative, that is, W t+1=n > 1. In this case, there cannot be an agreement that satis…es both players'expectations, as the sum of their continuation values from delay exceeds 1. Hence, there will be disagreement at such t regardless of the proposer. Player i's continuation value is given by:
Finally, if W t;t+1=n = 1, then the surplus is zero and the players are indi¤erent to agree.
Our …rst result shows the equilibrium is characterized by combining the three cases. (The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 in Yildiz (2003) , and hence is omitted.) Proposition 1 (Characterization and uniqueness). For each time t 2 T and player i 2 f1; 2g, the player's continuation value in any subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized as the unique stochastic process V i : T ! [0; 1] that solves the stochastic di¤erence equation
Throughout the paper, we study the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, by studying the stochastic di¤erence equation (5) . Our main objective is to understand when there is delay, i.e., when W t;t+1=n > 1. In general, under optimism, it is hard to compute the solution to (5) . We next present the benchmark case without optimism, in which the solution is rather straightforward.
Benchmark with Common Priors As a benchmark, consider the equilibrium under (CPA). In this case, it can be checked that players reach agreement at all times. In particular, players'continuation values sum to the size of the pie, V 
That is, when players have common priors, the overall bargaining power of a player is the expected discounted sum of his future instantaneous bargaining powers. The players weigh their bargaining power at di¤erent situations di¤erently. First, as expected, they discount the future bargaining powers in the same way as they discount their future payo¤s, using the e¤ective discount factor t;s = exp R s tr (s) ds . Second, they put higher weight to the bargaining power at times at which the e¤ective discount rater (t) is higher, that is, those times at which the deadline is more likely to arrive [cf. (1)]. Intuitively, the possibility that negotiations might end increases the cost of delay. This in turn raises the surplus from agreement, and thus, the weight of the players'bargaining power at these times [cf. (5)]. In particular, if there is a …rm deadline, the players'bargaining power just before the deadline has a large impact on their agreement shares.
Durability, Deadline, and Election E¤ects in a Canonical Case
In this section, we present a tractable canonical case, which we refer to as the Poisson model, for which there is a closed form solution without the (CPA). In this context, we illustrate how players'optimism is disciplined by a combination of durability and deadlines. We then present our main result, the durability e¤ect, and obtain the deadline and election e¤ects as its applications. We also present preliminary empirical evidence consistent with the election e¤ect and some of its comparative statics. We return to the general model in Section 5.
Baseline Poisson Model and Disciplining of Optimism
Consider a Poisson process with arrival rate . At each arrival, a new pair
bargaining powers is drawn from a …xed distribution (independently from earlier values of the bargaining power). The bargaining powers remain constant as (
until the next arrival. Let H i denote the distribution of i according to player i. We assume H i has full support over [0; 1] for simplicity. We let i = R dH i ( ) and assume players are optimistic about their expected bargaining powers conditional on an arrival, that is:
We also assume that the deadline arrives with a constant hazard rate, so that the e¤ective discount rate is constant,r (t) =r for all t.
In this example, players have a perpetual tendency to be optimistic. However, this tendency is countered by the durability of the bargaining power. In particular, the bargaining power remains constant at its current level until some important event, such as a …nancial meltdown, occurs. As this happens, the balance of the power between the players is completely reset. The players agree on how often such events occur (common ), but they are optimistic about these events'impact on the bargaining power.
More speci…cally, a player's expectation about his future bargaining power is a weighted average of his current bargaining power i t and his perceived long-run bargaining power i :
The durability of the bargaining power is captured by the inverse measure, 1= . When bar-gaining power is durable, so that 1= is large, the expectations re ‡ect the current bargaining power. This in turn reduces optimism. Indeed, players'optimism is given by:
Observe that the players do not have any optimism about the present, but as they consider increasingly distant future, optimism exponentially approaches y. The durability controls the speed at which optimism grows.
We next characterize the equilibrium in the Poisson model. To state the result, we denote the product of the e¤ective discount rate with the durability rate with =r= , and we refer to as the e¤ective durability rate.
Proposition 3 (Disciplining of Optimism in the Poisson Model).
In the baseline Poisson model, players reach agreement at each time with agreement shares given by
for some positive constant K n and L n . In the continuous time limit, the agreement share of each player i 2 f1; 2g is given by
with the corresponding constants
In particular, players reach agreement at all times with shares that are a weighted combination of their current bargaining powers and their expected values of long run bargaining powers. The weight on the current bargaining power, K ( ), is increasing in the e¤ective durability rate, =r= , while the weight on the long-run bargaining power, L ( ), is decreasing in . Observe also that, as ! 1, the weights satisfy K ( ) ! 1 and L ( ) ! 0.
In particular, as the durability becomes very high, 1= ! 1, or the deadline becomes very likely to arrive, so thatr ! 1, players' agreement shares approximate their current bargaining powers. Hence, Proposition 3 shows that players' optimism is disciplined by a combination of durability and deadlines.
To develop an intuition for this result, …x some time t and consider a prior time t = t =r; (11) so that the discount factor between time t and t is given by e . This normalization is useful since provides a measure of the payo¤ relevant distance between times t and t .
Consider the sum of the perceived payo¤s at time t from waiting until time t [cf. (4)], which we denote by W ( ) to simplify the notation. The representation in (9) implies
Perceived payo¤s are greater when players are more optimistic about their future bargaining powers and when the endogenous weight K ( ) that converts bargaining power to agreement shares is greater. Observe that if W ( ) > 1, then players disagree at time t since they are tempted by delaying the agreement until time t . Observe also that, for =r=n, the surplus from agreement at time t is given by 1 W ( ). In particular, a change in parameters that increases W ( ) reduces the surplus, which in turn reduces the e¤ect of current bargaining powers on agreement shares [cf. (5)]. Consequently, characterizing W ( ) is useful to understand whether players reach agreement as well as the terms of their agreement.
Using (8) and the normalization in (11), we further have:
where the last line is a linear approximation around = 0. This expression illustrates how players'optimism is disciplined by durability and deadlines. Indeed, while the sum of perceived payo¤s is increasing in optimism y, it is decreasing in the e¤ective durability rate =r= . This is true not only when K is …xed, but also when the equilibrium value of K in (10) is substituted in (13).
Intuitively, since durability reduces optimism about future bargaining power, it also naturally reduces optimism about future bargaining prospects. Deadlines provide a similar discipline by increasing the e¤ective discount rater, which shortens the time intervals over which players face equivalent trade-o¤s. Formally, given a payo¤-relevant time distance , a greater discount rater implies a smaller corresponding time distance t t = =r [cf.
( 11) ]. This in turn reduces the players' optimism at time t about their bargaining power at the nearby time t . Put di¤erently, if the deadline arrives rapidly, then the bargaining power cannot change much before the deadline arrives. Hence, even though the bargaining power is not highly durable in the strict sense of the word, it is durable relative to the small amount of time left until the end of negotiations.
As this intuition suggests, the two sources of discipline also naturally interact: That is, a deadline that is likely to arrive around time t provides greater discipline when the bargaining power is more durable around time t. The combined disciplining e¤ect is captured by the e¤ective durability rate =r= . Equation (10) illustrates that , along with the level of optimism y, is su¢ cient to characterize the bargaining outcomes. As higher disciplines players' optimism, it also increases the surplus from immediate agreement, which in turn increases K ( ). In the extreme, there is no room for optimism and players' agreement shares re ‡ect their agreement shares, i.e., lim !1 K ( ) = 1. Similarly, greater optimism y reduces the surplus from immediate agreement, which in turn reduces K ( ).
A naive view could also posit that a su¢ ciently high level of optimism y combined with a lack of discipline, i.e., low , reduces the surplus from agreement so much that players choose not to agree. This is not correct for the baseline Poisson model. Intuitively, given the stationarity of the environment, the behavior is independent of time. Since the players cannot disagree forever, this means that there is agreement at each time. Formally, the endogenously determined level of K ( ) is always su¢ ciently low to ensure K ( ) y <r= , so that W ( ) < 1 regardless of the parameters [cf. (13) ]. Hence, although optimism a¤ects the way players split the pie, it need not generate delays. As we will see in the rest of this section, this result is overturned when the e¤ective durability rate changes over time.
Durability and Deadline E¤ects in the Poisson Model
We next use the Poisson model to present our main result, the durability e¤ect, which also implies the deadline e¤ect. To this end, modify the Poisson model so that the arrival rate and the e¤ective discount rater (t) are possibly di¤erent before and after some …xed t . For t < t , we have (r (t) ; ) = (r 0 ; 0 ), yielding the e¤ective durability rate of 0 =r 0 = 0 . For t t , we have (r (t) ; ) = (r 1 ; 1 ), yielding a higher e¤ective durability rate of 1 =r 1 = 1 as in Figure 1 . Our next result shows that a su¢ ciently large increase in e¤ective durability induces delays. model with the assumption that 1 is su¢ ciently larger than 0 , so that:
Proposition 4 (Durability E¤ect in the Poisson Model). Consider the modi…ed Poisson
where K ( ) = +1+y . Then, there exists > 0 such that players disagree at each time t =r 0 ; t and agree at time t and thereafter. The length of disagreement, , is the unique solution to W = 1, where
Durability E¤ect As a special case, suppose there is no deadline so thatr 0 =r 1 = r, but the durability rate 1= increases su¢ ciently at time t , so that condition (14) holds.
Then, Proposition 4 implies that there is a period of disagreement before t , generalizing the durability e¤ect of Example 2.
Deadline E¤ect As another special case, suppose there is a stochastic deadline with exponential distribution F (t) = 1 e (t t ) starting at t . Put di¤erently, the deadline arrives starting at time t with a constant hazard rate =
. Then the e¤ective discount rate is given by:r
The corresponding e¤ective durability rates are given by 0 = r= 0 and 1 = (r + ) = 1 .
Suppose the deadline arrival rate is su¢ ciently large so that K ( 1 ) y > 0 . Then, Proposition 4 implies the players wait for t to reach an agreement, generalizing the deadline e¤ect of Example 1.
To prove Proposition 4, …rst note that the environment becomes stationary at t with e¤ective durability rate 1 . Hence, the analysis for the baseline model applies starting at t after replacing with 1 . Moreover, the sum of perceived payo¤s at time t =r 0 is still given by (12) . The only di¤erence is that the level of optimism y t;t is governed by a di¤erent set of parametersr 0 ; 0 that apply prior to t . Consequently, W ( ) is given by (15), which can be approximated around = 0 as:
Under condition (14) , W ( ) > 1 for each su¢ ciently small . Thus, there is a period of delay before t , and the length of delay is characterized by W = 1.
Intuitively, the low e¤ective durability prior to t implies there is little discipline on beliefs at time t, so that players can be optimistic about their bargaining prospects at time t . In contrast, a high e¤ective durability following t implies there is considerable discipline on optimism at t -as re ‡ected by a high K ( 1 ). If the increase in e¤ective durability is su¢ ciently large, then players wait until t to reach an agreement. Note also that the increase in e¤ective durability rate =r= can come from either an increase in the durability rate 1= or from an increase in the deadline arrival rate . Hence, durability and deadline e¤ects are two sides of the same coin.
How costly are the delays generated by deadline or durability e¤ects? To get a sense of magnitudes, consider a disagreement time t = t =r. The social cost of delaying the agreement until time t , as opposed to agreeing at time t, is given by 1 e . Using Eq.
(15), and the condition for delay, W ( ) 1, we can bound the social cost from above as:
Moreover, there are parameters under which the upper bound is attained (for instance, take 0 ! 0; K ( 1 ) ! 1 and consider = ). Hence, the social cost of delay, measured as a fraction of the total pie, is in the same ballpark as players'optimism about their long-run bargaining power, y. When parties are highly optimistic, so that y = 1, the cost can be as large as half of the total pie.
When is the deadline e¤ect more prominent? Our next result establishes comparative statics for the length of disagreement, . Note that also provides a measure of the maximum social cost of delay, 1 e , which obtains at the earliest disagreement time t = t =r.
Observation 1. Given the deadline described in (16), the length of disagreement, , is:
(i) decreasing in the durability rate before the deadline arrival 1= 0 , and increasing in the durability rate during deadline arrival 1= 1 ,
(ii) increasing in the deadline arrival rate , (iii) increasing in players'long-run optimism y.
(iv) When the deadline is su¢ ciently …rm (i.e., when is su¢ ciently high), is decreasing in the discount rate r.
The …rst two parts follow from (15) after observing that 0 = r= 0 and 1 = (r + ) = 1 .
The second part suggests there might be a silver lining to setting an uncertain or soft deadline in negotiations. An uncertain deadline, which we capture with low , generates two main e¤ects relative to a more deterministic deadline with high . First, it leads to more "compromise" at time t by the player that has the higher bargaining power at that time, as captured by a lower weight K ( 1 ). Depending on the context, this e¤ect might be desirable in itself. Second, because players realize there will be compromise at time t , their optimism about bargaining powers at time t translates relatively less into optimism about their agreement shares, leading to a shorter period of disagreement.
The third part generates an additional testable prediction linking optimism to delays.
Note from (15) that optimism has a direct e¤ect that tends to increase the sum of players' perceived payo¤s, W ( ). However, optimism after time t also has an indirect e¤ect that tends to reduce W ( ) by reducing the weight K ( 1 ). The net e¤ect is governed by the product K ( 1 ) y. By (10), the net e¤ect is positive and optimism increases W ( ). Intuitively, greater optimism leads to longer and costlier delays.
The last part considers the e¤ect of the discount rate r, which captures players'cost of delay. Higher cost of delay generates a direct e¤ect that tends to reduce W ( ) (captured by 0 = r= 0 ). However, higher r also generates an indirect e¤ect that tends to increase W ( ) by raising K ( 1 ) (captured by 1 = (r + ) = 1 ). The net e¤ect is in general ambiguous.
When the deadline is deterministic, the indirect e¤ect is muted because K ( 1 ) = 1 regardless of r. Consequently, as long as the deadline is su¢ ciently …rm, increasing r makes the deadline e¤ect less prominent.
Election E¤ect in the Poisson Model
We next modify the Poisson model further to present the election e¤ect. Suppose the effective discount rate is constant at a baseline rate,r (t) =r 0 , throughout. Imagine that the durability rate of bargaining power is constant everywhere except for a short period of "election date"at which it is highly transient. In particular, suppose the arrival rate satis…es
for some small " > 0 and some positive constant I with
Note that starts at 0 , increases to 0 + I " over a period of (t "; t ) and switches back to the original level. Accordingly, the e¤ective durability rate starts at 0 =r 0 = 0 , dips down
over a period of (t "; t ) and switches back to the original level as in Figure 2 . We will show that there is a long period of disagreement before t and provide comparative statics for the length of the delay. 4 This example could capture political negotiations for which the baseline durability rate is likely to be high. In this context, the arrival rate 0 re ‡ects rare events, such as extraordinary opening of a seat (e.g. due to a death), that change the positions of the existing o¢ ceholders.
In contrast, the higher arrival rate 0 + I " re ‡ects the impact of an election in which many o¢ ces are contested and can change hands. Our normalization ensures the conditional probability that the bargaining power changes due to the election is given by 1 e I , which is independent of the length of the election ". We refer to e I as the incumbency e¤ect, as this loosely captures the probability that the incumbent candidate with political power remains in o¢ ce (so that there is no change in bargaining power).
Proposition 5.
Consider the modi…ed Poisson model with the arrival rate in (18) and con- dition (19) . There exists > 0 such that players disagree at each time t =r 0 ; t and agree at time t and thereafter. Moreover, as " ! 0, the length of disagreement, , is the unique solution to W = 1, where:
In particular, a dip in durability due to an election generates a delay prior to the election, generalizing the election e¤ect of Example 3. The result requires the parametric condition (19) , which holds quite generally as long as the incumbent is replaced with positive probability, I > 0, and the election length is short, that is, as " ! 0.
The result that there is some delay before t follows from Proposition 4, since condition
The additional content of Proposition 5 is to show that the delay extends to times t t ", starting much before the election. Indeed, it is easy to check that as " ! 0, the length of delay, , remains strictly positive. Indeed, when the baseline bargaining power is highly durable, i.e., when 0 ! 1, the cost of delay due to the election e¤ect is approximately
by (20) . As in deadline and durability e¤ects, the social cost of delay due to the election e¤ect can be as large as half of the total pie.
The proof of Proposition 5 is similar to that of the durability e¤ect. The main di¤erence is that optimism for time t at some prior time t < t " is now calculated as
Here, e (t t) 0 captures the baseline survival probability [cf. (8) ] and e I is the incumbency e¤ect. Using this expression, the sum of players' perceived payo¤s from waiting at time t =r 0 (which is prior to t " as " ! 0) is now given by (20) . This expression can be approximated around = 0 as
Thus, there is a strictly positive period of disagreement before the election, and the length of delay is characterized by W = 1.
Intuitively, players are optimistic about their likelihood of "winning"the election. More speci…cally, they both believe the bargaining power will be reset during the election to a new value that is on average in their favor. Hence, there is little discipline on players'optimism in the run-up to an election. Indeed, note that y t;t 1 e I y > 0 for each t t ", that is, players have signi…cant optimism regardless of how soon the upcoming election will take place. In addition, there is more discipline on players' post-election beliefs, which implies their post-election agreement shares will re ‡ect to some extent their bargaining powers,
It follows that players disagree before the election in the hope that they will get a better deal after the election.
Hence, similar to the durability and deadline e¤ects, the election e¤ect also stems from an increase of discipline on players'beliefs. The election e¤ect further illustrates the discipline at a time is determined by the "weakest link"of e¤ective durability following that time. In particular, note that there is little discipline at time t < t " for beliefs at time t despite the fact that the bargaining power is quite durable over most of the interval [t; t ]. Put di¤erently, if there is a period of transience, such as an election, durability in the rest of that period does not create much discipline.
We next establish comparative statics for the length of disagreement , which also captures the maximum cost of delay, 1 e . For the limit case of 0 ! 1, (21) already establishes that is an increasing function of the product (1 e I )y. Our result establishes these and other comparative statics more generally. When combined with political term limits, the …rst part also implies a lame duck e¤ect.
An incumbent politician approaching the end of his/her term limit-sometimes referred to as a lame duck-is not allowed to be reelected, which implies a zero incumbency e¤ect, e I = 0. In contrast, a similar incumbent who is eligible to be reelected is likely to be associated with a positive incumbency e¤ect, e I > 0. Observation 2 then suggests that lame duck incumbents (in the above sense) are likely to be associated with more frequent delays in the run-up to elections. In Section 4.4, we test this prediction in the context of legislative politics in the US, utilizing the two-term limit for the US presidency.
The second part of Observation 2 is similar to its analogue in the deadline e¤ect. In this context, players are presumably more optimistic when the election is more closely contested (as this would make the outcome more uncertain). With this interpretation, the second part generates an additional testable prediction that delays are more likely before elections that are more closely contested.
To understand the third part, note that a higher durability rate 1= 0 a¤ects the length of disagreement in two ways. First, it lowers optimism (due to the term e = 0 ), shortening the delay. More importantly, it increases the rate K ( 0 ) at which post-election bargaining powers translate into agreement shares, increasing the delay. As we show in the appendix, the latter e¤ect dominates. A high 1= 0 could be thought of as capturing politically stable democracies in which most of the important changes to bargaining power happen during elections-as opposed to politically unstable democracies in which the bargaining power can also change in non-election times. Under this interpretation, the third part suggests the election e¤ect is more prominent in politically stable democracies.
The last part follows as a corollary to the third part, since what matters for the length of disagreement is the e¤ective durability rate 0 = r 0 = 0 . To illustrate this result, consider the tax cut negotiations of September 1999 in the US, which took place before the elections in 2000. This was a highly visible political negotiation in which politicians presumably had highr 0 -since voters could punish them for the resulting stalemate. 5 A naive view could then suggest the election e¤ect is less likely to generate delays in this case. Our analysis establishes the opposite result: Whenr 0 is higher, the election e¤ect induces longer and costlier delays. This is because, although higherr 0 increases the cost of delaying agreement until the election, it also changes the post-election agreement terms, captured by a higher K ( 0 ). Intuitively, the higher cost of delay forces the player that loses the election to accept the terms of the player that wins the election. In our model, the second e¤ect dominates (since the subsequent election is very far, at t = 1), leading to longer and costlier delays.
Election E¤ect in Legislative Politics in the US
We next analyze gridlock in legislative politics in the US, to test the election e¤ect of Proposition 5 as well as the lame duck e¤ect implied by Observation 2.
We test the election e¤ect by replicating Mayhew's (1991) analysis mentioned in the introduction while also including more recent data. Speci…cally, we categorize the 33 US Congresses between 1947-2012 based on the time frame they fall within the 4-year presidential term. We measure legislative gridlock by the inverse of the number of important laws enacted by the Congress, as categorized by Mayhew (1991) . 6 Figure 3 shows that, consistent with the election e¤ect, the US Congresses enacted about 25% fewer important laws on average when they convened in the two years before a presidential election relative to the two years after. Hence, the empirical regularity identi…ed in Mayhew (1991) continues to hold once we include more recent data-with about the same size and greater statistical signi…cance.
To test the lame duck e¤ect, we utilize the presidential term limit in the US. According to a constitutional amendment rati…ed in 1947, no person is allowed to be elected to the US presidency more than twice. Consequently, the lame duck e¤ect discussed after Observation 2 suggests that an upcoming presidential election should generate more frequent legislative Unfortunately, the evidence in Figure 4 (as well as Figure 3) is not statistically signi…cant. This is expected, partly because we only have 30 data points in total divided across four 7 We have excluded the congresses between 1947-1952, which convened during the presidency of Harry Truman. This is becuase, as the sitting president, Truman was exempted from the two-term limit rati…ed categories, and partly because there are many more factors excluded from our analysis that might also a¤ect legislative gridlock (see Binder (2003) for a review). We therefore view our …ndings as preliminary evidence, which should be subject to closer empirical scrutiny as the relevant data becomes available.
General Result
We next generalize our main result, the durability e¤ect, beyond the canonical case in the previous section. There are subtle di¢ culties in de…ning a general notion of durability that disciplines players'heterogeneous prior beliefs. After describing a main di¢ culty, we propose two notions of durability, one stronger than the other, that provide such discipline. We also show deadlines and durability play a common disciplining role, not only in the Poisson model, but also more generally. We then establish a generalized durability e¤ect, and discuss how this result also naturally implies deadline and election e¤ects. 
Durability and Disciplining of Beliefs
Our …rst goal is to identify general notions of durability for the stochastic process, that the players agree on division ( ; 1 ) as in Proposition 2. This is far from the case when is near 1: they agree to give almost everything to player 1 at the beginning. To see this, observe that at the "zero-probability" state 3, they agree on division (1; 0). Now, at state 1, player 2 is certain that the next state is 3 and she will get 0. Then, at state 1, the agreement gives almost everything to player 1; he gets V 1 (1) = = (1 (1 ) ) by (5) . Likewise, at state 2, he gets V 1 (2) = + (1 ) 2 = (1 ), leaving player 2 almost nothing:
. Finally, at state 0, he gets almost everything:
The main reason for such a stark divergence is as follows. The bargaining outcome depends not only on the beliefs about how bargaining power will evolve, but also on the beliefs about how the other players'beliefs will evolve, the beliefs about how those beliefs will evolve and so on. This is glossed over in common-prior models-thanks to the law of iterated expectations. Without a common prior, the individuals'beliefs about the bargaining power do not put any meaningful restriction on those higher-order beliefs. In the above example, although player 1 is certain that the bargaining power will remain unchanged, he is also certain that the other player will soon start worrying that she will no longer have any bargaining power in the future despite her current certainty that the bargaining powers will remain unchanged. This makes player 1 highly optimistic about her bargaining prospects in the future. On the other hand, although player 2 is certain that the bargaining power will remain unchanged, she is also certain that the other player will soon become highly optimistic about his bargaining power despite his current belief. This makes player 2 pessimistic about the future. Altogether, these e¤ects lead to an agreement that gives nearly everything to player 1.
For a proper de…nition of durability that disciplines beliefs, one then needs to make sure not only that the players believe that the bargaining power is durable but also that all higher-order beliefs re ‡ect such durability. Our …rst de…nition ensures this by requiring that all players'expectations about the future bargaining power remain close to the current bargaining power throughout. 
De…nition 1 (Durability
The largest D with the above property is called durability rate and denoted by D t;s .
Our notion of durability requires that a player's expectation of the future bargaining power is Lipschitz-continuous in time. The durability rate D determines how close the 8 Observe formally that, as ! 1,
expectations must be to the current bargaining power as a fraction of the time di¤erence.
The higher is D, the lower the expected deviation, and the more durable is the bargaining power. To …nd the durability rate in the baseline Poisson model, note that for any interval t ;s [t; s], we have:
for each i, where = max f 1 ; 1 1 ; 2 ; 1 2 g 2 (0; 1] is a constant. It is easy to check that D cannot be taken higher than 1= ( ), which implies D t;s = 1= ( ). In particular, the durability rate is always bounded below by 1= , and it is equal to 1= if at least one player is extremely optimistic, i.e., i = 1 for some i. The next result uses this notion of durability to establish a general bound on players'payo¤s.
Lemma 1.
If the bargaining power is durable on [t; s] for some t; s 2 T , then
In particular, letting " = max ( t;s ; (s t)=D t;s ), we also have
To understand this result, consider s chosen su¢ ciently large so that t;s is below some desired ". Then, the result says that the continuation values at t are close to bargaining powers at t, as long as the bargaining power is su¢ ciently durable over this interval, i.e., (s t)=D t;s is also below ". Intuitively, as in the Poisson model, durability of the bargaining power disciplines players'optimism. Indeed, our de…nition of durability implies the following bound on players'optimism:
Moreover, durability also implies players'future bargaining powers are close to their current bargaining powers. The general solution (6) with common priors then suggests players' continuation values must also be close to their current bargaining powers. Under our notion of durability, a similar logic applies with heterogeneous priors and implies Lemma 1.
While Lemma 1 establishes some discipline on continuation values, it is silent about how those continuation values are obtained. In particular, it is not clear whether players reach an agreement at time t (as in the case with common priors). Establishing this requires a slight strengthening of the notion of durability. To this end, write 
The largest D with the above property is called strong durability rate and denoted by D t;s .
That is, in each player's view, the bargaining power is Lipschitz-continuous with rate c L , with the exception of some rare "jump"events which happen with a rate slower than c J . To …nd the strong durability rate in the Poisson model, note that for any t ;s [t; s], we have:
Thus, condition (25) holds with c L = 0 and c J = . It can further be checked that D t;s = 1= . In particular, the strong durability rate in the Poisson model is exactly 1= , which is (weakly) smaller than the durability rate 1= ( ). This is a general feature: As the name suggests, strong durability over an interval [t; s] implies (weak) durability, which in turn implies D t;s D t;s .
9
Strong durability disciplines players'optimism further in the sense that they both believe they reach an agreement with high probability after time t. To state this formally, let t a (!)
denote the …rst date with agreement, namely the settlement date, at state !. We use the convention that t a (!) = 1 when players fail to agree before the deadline. Let
9 The di¤erence 1 s 1 t , which is bounded by 1, cannot exceed c L (s t) on the event L c L ; t; s . Hence, under strong durability, we have:
implying weak durability.
denote the states in which players agree before the deadline and before time s.
Lemma 2. If bargaining power is strongly durable on [t; s] for some t; s 2 T , then
for each i, where " = max t;s ; (s t) =D t;s .
In words, when the bargaining power is strongly durable on [t; s], where s is chosen appropriately to make t;s small, then each player assigns a high probability that they will reach an agreement before s (and before the deadline arrives). There is a simple intuition for this result. By Lemma 1, the continuation value of a player i at time t is high. Then, she must assign a high probability P r i t (A s ) on reaching an agreement before s, since otherwise she gets at most a small payo¤, t;s " . Unfortunately, this argument does not lead to a very high lower bound for P r i t (A s ). It leads to a lower bound for P r 1 t (A s ) + P r 2 t (A s ) that is nearly 1. In the appendix, using more subtle arguments based on strong durability, we show that each of these probabilities is nearly 1.
Common Disciplining Role of Deadlines and Durability
Note that the required durability for Lemmas 1 and 2 depend not only on the rate of durability, D t;s , but also on the length of the interval, s t. In particular, the smaller we can choose the term " = max f t;s ; (s t)=D t;s g, the tighter will be the bound established in Lemma 1 and the more beliefs will be disciplined. If we can choose s close to t while still making t;s low, as would be the case with a deadline that arrives at a rapid rate, then a little bit of durability over a relatively short interval is su¢ cient to discipline players'bargaining prospects. Without a deadline, we have to choose s relatively large. In this case, disciplining requires a higher rate of durability over a longer interval. Hence, as in the Poisson model, deadlines and durability provide a similar discipline on players'beliefs.
Towards formalizing this relationship, let
T SD = ft 2 T jbargaining power is strongly durable on [t; s] for some s > tg :
For any t 2 T SD and any s > t, we de…ne E (t; s) = max f t;s ; (s t)=D t;s g as the e¤ective variability over the interval [t; s]; we use the convention that D t;s = 0 and E (t; s) = 1 whenever the bargaining power is not durable on [t; s]. We also de…ne
as the minimum e¤ective variability following time t 2 T SD . We de…ne E (t; s) and E (t)
analogously as using the strong notion of durability. Observe that E (t) is weakly decreasing in durability rate D t;s and in the conditional arrival probability (1 F (s)) = (1 F (t)) of deadline for any [t; s]. Any increase in durability or in the arrival probability of deadline weakly decreases minimum e¤ective variability E (t) and thereby puts a greater discipline on expectations in equilibrium, as the next result states. Let A A 1 denote the states in which players agree before the deadline [cf. Eq. (26)].
Proposition 6 (Disciplining of Beliefs). For any t 2 T SD and any i,
. This result, which is an immediate corollary to Lemmas 1 and 2, combines the disciplining roles of durability and deadlines. Whenever the durability rate of bargaining power or the arrival probability of deadline is higher on an interval [t; s], we have lower e¤ective variability, leading to tighter bounds on the bargaining prospects at time t in Proposition 6.
It is also instructive to consider the e¤ective variability in the Poisson model, which is closely related the e¤ective durability rate =r= that played a central role in Section 4. The minimum e¤ective variability in the baseline Poisson model is given by E (t) = min s t e r(s t) ; (s t) and characterized as the unique positive solution to the equation e E(t) = E (t) . In particular, E (t) is decreasing in and it limits to 0 as ! 1. Hence, Proposition 6 provides a more general counterpart to Proposition 3.
Durability, Deadline, and Election E¤ects
We next present a generalized durability e¤ect and discuss its implications for deadline and election e¤ects. Given times t; t 2 T , with t < t , we quantify the e¤ective optimism at t about t by O (t; t ) 1 + y t;t 1= t;t :
Observe that e¤ective optimism is increasing in optimism y t;t about t and decreasing in the discount rate t;t between times t and t . Intuitively, it provides a measure of players' tendency to delay agreement until time t .
Proposition 7 (General Result). For any t 2 T SD , there is disagreement at each t < t
Moreover, each player i assigns high probability on reaching an agreement after t :
.
In particular, the agreement is delayed beyond time t whenever the optimism about t exceeds four times the e¤ective variability, 4E (t ), throughout t t . Note also that, since low e¤ective variability disciplines optimism, a high level of optimism about t requires a high level of e¤ective variability before t . Indeed, it is easy to check-as we do in the appendix-that condition (28) implies:
Hence, the result requires an increase in e¤ective durability at time t in the sense that the e¤ective variability over the interval [t; t ] is substantially greater than the minimum e¤ective variability following time t .
Intuitively, as we have formalized in Proposition 6, low e¤ective variability (or high e¤ective durability) after time t induces players to reach agreement with shares that are close to their immediate bargaining powers. Moreover, high e¤ective variability before time t allows players to be optimistic about their bargaining prospects from waiting until time t . The combination of the two e¤ects leads to possibly long delays before t . Note that, while the lack of discipline on beliefs before time t automatically translates into optimism (for a …xed y > 0) in the Poisson model, optimism needs to be assumed explicitly as in (28) in the general model.
All in all, Proposition 7 establishes a generalized durability e¤ect: if the bargaining power becomes durable starting at a key date, then players reach agreement after that date with high probability. Moreover, players receive payo¤s that are close to their contemporaneous bargaining powers. If the players are su¢ ciently optimistic about these bargaining powers, then they fail to reach an agreement before then. Proposition 7 implies the deadline and election e¤ects, as we explain next.
Deadline E¤ect Fix any small " > 0 and any t 2 T SD , where bargaining power is strongly durable on some [t ; s]. Imagine that the deadline arrives between t and s = t + "D t ; s s with high probability:
Then, Proposition 7 implies that the players delay the agreement at any t < t with O (t; t ) > 4" and reach an agreement within interval [t ; s] with very high probability. This establishes the deadline e¤ect in our general model.
To see this, observe from (1) and (30) there is disagreement at any t < t with O (t; t ) > 4". Moreover, the lower bound for the probability of reaching an agreement before the deadline is 1 6"= ( There is a deep mathematical connection between the durability and the deadline e¤ects.
According to (1) , arrival probability of a deadline increases the e¤ective discount rate by an amount of f (t) = (1 F (t)), the hazard rate of the deadline. This is equivalent to stretching the time at t by 1=r times the hazard rate, making the bargaining power more durable. The change in durability is proportional to the hazard rate of the deadline.
Election E¤ect Elections have the opposite e¤ect on time: the changes that could take a long period of time happen in a short span of the time. Such an e¤ect can be viewed as compressing the time and making the bargaining power less durable. This allows the players to form highly optimistic beliefs about their bargaining power after the election even right before the election. In Proposition 7, this corresponds to having a large O (t; t ) when there is an election right before t . Since the bargaining power after the election is not a¤ected, this means that the durability of the bargaining power jumps up at the end of the election period, enticing the optimistic parties to wait for the end of the election period for reaching an agreement. This version of the durability e¤ect is called the election e¤ect. The periods of compressed times such as election periods are important because they lead to a long period of disagreement in earlier times when the players are optimistic. This is because the overall durability on an interval is mainly determined by the times of least durability in the interval as we illustrated in the Poisson model.
Relation to the Literature
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we develop a model in which the bargaining power is a continuous-time stochastic process. Second, we apply our model to provide a uni…ed explanation for deadline, election, and durability e¤ects. We next discuss these contributions relative to the previous literature.
By taking the bargaining power as a primitive process, our model enables us to capture durability naturally by imposing conditions on the underlying process-independent of how frequently players come together. In contrast, the basic alternating o¤er bargaining models, e.g., Rubinstein (1982) , imply a highly non-durable bargaining power that shifts from one extreme to another in…nitely frequently. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst paper to study the durability of the bargaining power within the bargaining literature. In Our model also enables us to capture optimism about bargaining power by allowing the players to have heterogeneous beliefs about the underlying process. Yildiz (2003 Yildiz ( , 2004 analyze related models in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power-also modeled as players' probability of making take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. The main di¤erences are that we allow for more general bargaining power processes, and we assume that players observe the current realizations of the bargaining power. The observability assumption naturally puts some discipline on optimism. Our analysis reveals that the extent of discipline crucially depends on the durability of the bargaining power. Unlike Yildiz (2003) , we also allow deadlines to be stochastic, which seem to be the case in many real world bargaining situations (see Remark 2 in Section 2).
Our paper is part of a theoretical literature that attempts to explain the deadline e¤ect-which is commonly observed in negotiations in practice. The logic of Example 1 is the same as the logic of a two-period example in Yildiz (2003) . Unfortunately, the delay in the example of Yildiz (2003) is highly fragile against stochastic deadlines: the players reach an immediate agreement in the continuous-time limit whenever the deadline is stochastic-with a density f . This is problematic because there is a signi…cant amount of uncertainty about the deadline in real-life situations where the deadline e¤ect is common. For example, in the case of pretrial negotiations, it may take months for the court to announce its decision. In contrast, the deadline e¤ect is robust against such uncertainty in our paper. Indeed, a part of our contribution is to shed light on how the size of the deadline e¤ect relates to the uncertainty about the deadline and durability of the bargaining power. Spier (1992) shows that, in a pre-trial negotiation with incomplete information, the settlement probability will be a U-shaped function of time, consistent with the deadline e¤ect.
Ma and Manove (1993) develop a model in which delay is not costly and a player can wait as much as she wants before making an o¤er. They show that the player waits until the deadline and makes a last minute take-it-or-leave it o¤er. Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988) informally discuss a possible explanation based on the idea that there is no cost of delay except for a cost at the end due to a slight uncertainty about the deadline. 11 Our model provides an alternative explanation for the deadline e¤ect based on players'optimism about their bargaining powers around the deadline.
Our paper is also part of a literature that analyzes the sources of gridlock in legislative politics (see Binder (2003) for a review). One strand of this literature emphasizes upcoming elections as a potential contributing factor to gridlock. In recent work, Ortner (2013) formalizes a mechanism for gridlock based on the idea that parties'agreement decisions might in ‡uence the outcome of the election. We formalize a di¤erent mechanism based on parties' optimism about the outcome of the election. In Section 4.3, we also delineate conditions under which this mechanism is stronger, generating additional testable predictions-including a lame duck e¤ect. In Section 4.4, we also document new (yet preliminary) empirical evidence that points to particularly severe legislative gridlock in the US as the president approaches the end of his/her term limit-consistent with our lame duck e¤ect.
Our durability e¤ect-which implies the deadline and election e¤ects as special cases-is also conceptually related to several papers that generate bargaining delays with optimism.
In Example 2 discussed in the Introduction, at time t , Ann and Bob learn about their future bargaining powers, reaching an agreement that re ‡ects that bargaining power. As a result, Ann waits in the hope that Bob will learn at time t and be persuaded to agree to her terms (and vice versa for Bob). This motive of waiting to persuade plays an implicit but a crucial role in our model due to durability. Such a motive has been explored in distinct environments in Yildiz (2004a) , Thanassoulis (2010), Galasso (2012) , and others.
In multilateral bargaining, optimism can cause delay through other mechanisms (Ali, 2006) that do not play a role here.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the conditions under which optimism about future bargaining power leads to costly gridlock and delays in negotiations. We established a general durability e¤ect by which a dramatic increase in discipline on players'beliefs leads to ex-ante delays.
We showed that deadlines and elections play a similar role in disciplining beliefs, and that they both lead to ex-ante delays in negotiations. The deadline e¤ect is more prominent when players are more optimistic and when the deadline is less uncertain. For …rm deadlines, the e¤ect is also less prominent when players perceive a greater cost of delay. The election e¤ect is more prominent when the incumbent candidate is more likely to be replaced-which also implies a lame duck e¤ect for an incumbent that is not eligible to be reelected. The election e¤ect is also more prominent when players are more optimistic and when the bargaining power is more durable during non-election times. Interestingly, the election e¤ect is also more prominent-and gridlock is more likely-when players perceive a greater cost of delay.
We have also empirically analyzed legislative gridlock in the US, and presented preliminary evidence consistent with our election and lame duck e¤ects. Speci…cally, the US Congresses that convene before a presidential election seem to enact fewer important laws, and especially so when the incumbent US president is approaching the end of his/her twoterm limit. We leave a more complete empirical test of election and lame duck e¤ects-as well as other predictions of our theory-for future work.
While we focused on deadlines and elections, durability may vary in a predictable way also in other situations, a¤ecting the time and the terms of agreements according to our model. For example, a pending reform, such as a labor law or tort reform, might a¤ect the bargaining power of parties in related negotiations, such as wage negotiations or pre-trial negotiations. The players' bargaining power is less durable before the law is enacted-as there could be last minute changes in the law-and it becomes more durable after the law is enacted-as it takes time to enact a new law. Our model then predicts that pending major reforms would cause delays in related individual negotiations. By the same token, one could expect delays in a wide range of individual non-political negotiations prior to the election, as the outcome of the election may provide precise information about the terms of the laws that will pass.
For clarity, we largely focused on a tractable model with a Poisson "reversion"process for the bargaining power-although we also established our main results more broadly in Section 5. While our Poisson model has many appealing properties, it also has some unappealing ones. For example, any change in the balance of power erases all the memory. Nevertheless, all of our insights could be captured in a more general setup. For example, one can take t;m can be taken as the level of control party i has on that o¢ ce. Such a process exhibits more appealing properties, e.g., the current bargaining power has an impact over the future bargaining power even after it changes. All of our results can be extended to this more general setup. The general setup also enables an exploration of additional issues, e.g., how various dimensions of bargaining power-and optimism about those dimensions-a¤ect the terms as well as the timing of agreement. We leave the analysis of these issues for future work.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Throughout the appendix, we let t = t;t+1=n denote the one period discount factor to simplify the notation.
Proof of Proposition 2. We conjecture that players agree at each time. Under this conjecture, the surplus at each time is given by 1 W t;t+1=n = 1 t . Moreover, the di¤erence equation (5) has a closed form solution given by: 
for each t and i t , where n = 1 e r=n = e r=n e (r+ )=n :
Note that as n ! 1, n approaches =r= , and the agreement shares approach the shares in (9) (10). Hence, the proposition follows immediately from the claim.
To prove the claim, by Proposition 1, it su¢ ces to verify that the conjecture in (31) is indeed a solution to (5) . Check that, using (7), 
Since 1 t + 2 t = 1 and 1 + 2 = y + 1, this further yields
= e r=n 1 + 1 e =n n y n + 1 + y ! :
In particular, the surplus is given by 1 W t;t+1=n = 1 e r=n n + 1 n + 1 + y > 0:
In order to verify (5), write 1 W t;t+1=n 
